A Comparative Philosophical Inquiry into Modern Western Philosophy of Language and the Buddhist Discourse on the Expressible and the Inexpressible - Focusing on Wittgenstein and the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate-

doi:10.23058/brcr.2026..18.005

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일반논문

A Comparative Philosophical Inquiry into Modern Western Philosophy of Language and the Buddhist Discourse on the Expressible and the Inexpressible - Focusing on Wittgenstein and the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate- 현대 서구 언어철학과 불교 언설·불가설 논의의 비교철학적 고찰 -비트겐슈타인, 드레이퍼스-맥도웰 논의를 중심으로-: Kim, Taesoo
김태수; Research Professor, Seoul National University

서울대학교 규장각한국학연구원 연구교수, tskim1003@snu.ac.kr

30 April 2026. pp. 115-140

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Abstract

본 논문은 현대 서구 언어철학의 주요 논의와 불교의 언설(言說)·불가설(不可說) 문제를 비교철학적 관점에서 고찰한다. 먼저 비트겐슈타인의 언어게임론과 나가르주나의 가명(假名, prajñapti) 개념을 비교하여, 양자가 언어의 비본질적·맥락의존적 성격에 대한 자각을 공유하면서도 불교가 명언습기(名言習氣) 이론을 통해 언어적 분별의 형성 과정 자체를 인식론적·존재론적으로 해명하는 데까지 나아감을 밝힌다. 이어서 프리스트의 차합논리와 불교의 사구논리(catuṣkoṭi)를 비교하여, 형식적 유사성과 함께 전자가 모순의 논리적 허용에 머무는 반면 후자는 명제 성립의 전제 자체를 해체하고 해탈의 실천으로 귀결된다는 목적론적 차이를 규명한다. 나아가 드레이퍼스-맥도웰 논쟁을 유식의 무분별지(nirvikalpaka-jñāna)·분별지(savikalpaka-jñāna) 구분, 삼성설(三性說), 중관의 이제 불가분리 논증과 교차시켜 전반성적 직관과 개념적 지각의 대립이 불교적 사유 안에서 어떻게 회통될 수 있는지를 검토한다. 유식 사분설의 자증분(自證分)이 제시하는 전개념적 자기현현은 이 논쟁의 양자택일적 구도를 넘어서는 관점을 제공하며, 원효의 비일비이(非一非異)적 회통은 언설과 불가설의 긴장이 실재의 이중적 현현 구조에 근거함을 보여준다. 이상의 비교를 통해 본 논문은 불교의 불가설 담론이 언어의 한계에 대한 단순한 부정적 선언이 아니라, 언어 행위 자체 안에서 언설과 불가설의 긴장을 동시적으로 현현시키는 수행적 실천임을 밝히고, 동서 비교철학의 새로운 대화 가능성을 제시한다.

키워드

언설

불가설

가명

무분별지

비트겐슈타인

드레이퍼스-맥도웰 논쟁

삼성설

This paper examines the major discussions in modern Western philosophy of language and the Buddhist problematic of the expressible (言說, abhidhāna) and the inexpressible (不可說, anabhilāpya) from a comparative philosophical perspective. First, by comparing Wittgenstein’s language-game theory with Nāgārjuna’s concept of provisional designation (假名, prajñapti), it demonstrates that while both share an awareness of the non-essentialist and context-dependent nature of language, Buddhism advances further toward an epistemological and ontological elucidation of the very process by which linguistic discrimination is formed, through the Yogācāra theory of linguistic habituation (名言習氣, abhilāpa-vāsanā). It then compares Priest’s paraconsistent logic with the Buddhist tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), identifying both structural similarities and a fundamental teleological difference: between the accommodation of contradiction at the level of truth-values and the dismantling of the presuppositions underlying propositional formation, which culminates in the practice of liberation. Furthermore, by intersecting the Dreyfus-McDowell debate with the Yogācāra distinction between non-conceptual cognition (無分別智, nirvikalpaka-jñāna) and conceptual cognition (分別智, savikalpaka-jñāna), the three-nature theory (三性說, trisvabhāva), and the Madhyamaka argument for the inseparability of the two truths, this paper examines how the opposition between pre-reflective intuition and conceptual perception can be reconciled within Buddhist thought. The pre-conceptual self-awareness (自證分, svasaṃvedana) articulated in the Yogācāra four-aspect theory of cognition offers a perspective that transcends the dichotomous framework of this debate, while Wŏnhyo’s reconciliation through the logic of “neither identical nor different” (非一非異) demonstrates that the tension between the expressible and the inexpressible is grounded in the dual manifestation structure of reality itself. Through these comparisons, this paper argues that the Buddhist discourse on the inexpressible is not merely a negative declaration regarding the limits of language, but a performative practice that simultaneously manifests the tension between the expressible and the inexpressible within the very act of linguistic engagement, and thereby opens new possibilities for dialogue in East-West comparative philosophy.

Keywords

the expressible

the inexpressible

prajñapti

nirvikalpaka-jñāna

Wittgenstein

Dreyfus-McDowell debate

trisvabhāva

References

• 약호 및 원전

MMK: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
PP: Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
PS: Pramāṇasamuccaya
PV: Pramāṇavārttika
H: 韓國佛敎全書
T: 大正新脩大藏經

• 원전

金剛三昧經論(H1)
起信論海東疏 (H1)
大智度論(T25)
大慧度經宗要(H1)
成唯識論(T31)
十門和諍論(H1)
二障義(H1: 792b)
二諦義(T45)
仁王般若波羅蜜經(T8)
解深密經(T16)
Kimura (ed.) (2007). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Vol. I-1. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin.
Siderits, M. · Katsura, S. ed. (2013). Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Pradhan, P. ed. (1975). Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. 1st ed. 1967 ; revised 2nd ed. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Center.

• 단행본 및 논문

가다머, 한스 게오르그(2012). 『진리와 방법』 2, 임홍배 역. 파주: 문학동네.
김태수
2018a 「원효의 화쟁논법 연구: 사구(四句) 논리를 중심으로」, 서울대학교 철학과 박사학위논문.
2018b 「원효의 부정방식에 나타난 불교 논리학적 특성: 명사부정과 타자부정(anyāpoha)을 중심으로」, 『인문논총』 Vol. 47. 창원: 경남대학교 인문과학연구소.
2024 「길장 이제설의 중층적 특성-헤겔 변증법 형식과 열린 변증법적 함의를 중심으로」, 『동아시아불교문화』 Vol. 61. 부산: 동아시아불교문화학회.
박대용(동광)
2018 「디그나가의 아포하론에 있어 ‘말의 의미’(śabdārtha) －‘푸른 연꽃’(nīlotpala)과 ‘까마귀 둥지’(kākanilaya)의 사례 분석을 중심으로 」, 『불교학연구』 Vol. 57. 서울: 불교학연구회
2022 「유가행중관학파(YogācāraMādhyamika)의 아포하론 수용과 전개 연구- 샨따락시따와 까말라쉴라를 중심으로 」, 『선문화연구』 Vol. 33. 서울: 한국불교선리연구원
2023 「다르마끼르띠의 아포하(apoha) 변용과 특징에 관한 연구」, 『불교학연구』 Vol. 77. 서울: 불교학연구회
박영학(2009). 「원효의 언어관 연구」, 『원불교사상과 종교문화』 Vol. 42. 익산: 원불교사상연구원.
배경아
2013 「아포하론의 새로운 분류에 대한 고찰」, 『동아시아불교문화』 Vol. 0. No. 14. 부산: 동아시아불교문화학회.
2015 「디그나가(Dignāga)의 아포하론」, 한국연구재단 연구보고서.
Baker, Don(2008). Korean Spirituality, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
10.21313/hawaii/9780824832339.001.0001
Blomberg, Johan · Przemysław Żywiczyński(2022). “Language and Its Limits: Meaning, Reference and the Ineffable in Buddhist Philosophy.” Topoi, Vol. 41, pp. 483-496.
10.1007/s11245-021-09756-z
Dreyfus, Hubert L.
1972 What Computers Can‘t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.
1991 Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger‘s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge: MIT Press.
2002 “Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 367-383.
10.1023/A:1021351606209
2014 “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental.” in Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action. ed. Mark A. Wrathall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-65.
Dreyfus, Hubert L. · Stuart E. Dreyfus(1986). Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. New York: Free Press.
Dunne, John D. (2004). Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Franco, Eli(1997). Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien.
Garfield, Jay(2002). Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10.1093/oso/9780195145519.001.0001
Hattori, Masaaki(1968). Dignāga, On Perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
Hayes, Richard P.(1988). Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2
Ho, Chien-hsing(2014). “The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang’s Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy.” In Chen-kuo Lin · Michael Radich (eds.), A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, pp. 397-418.
10.15460/hup.79.606
Kant, Immanuel
1911 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Bd. III, Berlin: Georg Reimer.
1998 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer · Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Katsura, Shoryu
1979 “The Apoha Theory of Dignāga.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 28(1), pp. 16-20.
1991 “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha.” In Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 129-146.
Kim, Taesoo and Kim, Dugsam (2024). “The Common Orientation of Community Psychology and Wonhyo’s Thought: ‘One Mind’, ‘Harmonizing Disputes’ and ‘Non.hindrance’ in Focus,” Religions 15(7), pp. 12-25.
10.3390/rel15070857
Kellner, Birgit et al.(eds.) (2020). Reverberations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
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Priest, Graham
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2010 “The Logic of the Catuṣkoṭi.” Comparative Philosophy, Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 24-54.
Schmithausen, Lambert(1973). “On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism.” In German Scholars on India. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, pp. 235-250.
Siderits, Mark · Tom Tillemans · Arindam Chakrabarti(eds.) (2011). Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Stcherbatsky, Theodore(1930-1932). Buddhist Logic, 2 vols. Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
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Information

Publisher :불교의례문화연구소
Publisher(Ko) :불교의례문화연구소
Journal Title :Intangible Culture
Journal Title(Ko) :무형문화연구
Volume : 18
Pages :115-140
DOI :https://doi.org/10.23058/brcr.2026..18.005

[1] MMK: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

[2] PP: Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā

[3] PS: Pramāṇasamuccaya

[4] PV: Pramāṇavārttika

[5] H: 韓國佛敎全書

[6] T: 大正新脩大藏經

[7] 金剛三昧經論(H1)

[8] 起信論海東疏 (H1)

[9] 大智度論(T25)

[10] 大慧度經宗要(H1)

[11] 成唯識論(T31)

[12] 十門和諍論(H1)

[13] 二障義(H1: 792b)

[14] 二諦義(T45)

[15] 仁王般若波羅蜜經(T8)

[16] 解深密經(T16)

[17] Kimura (ed.) (2007). Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Vol. I-1. Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin.

[18] Siderits, M. · Katsura, S. ed. (2013). Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

[19] Pradhan, P. ed. (1975). Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. 1st ed. 1967 ; revised 2nd ed. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Center.

[20] 가다머, 한스 게오르그(2012). 『진리와 방법』 2, 임홍배 역. 파주: 문학동네.

[21] 김태수

[22] 2018a 「원효의 화쟁논법 연구: 사구(四句) 논리를 중심으로」, 서울대학교 철학과 박사학위논문.

[23] 2018b 「원효의 부정방식에 나타난 불교 논리학적 특성: 명사부정과 타자부정(anyāpoha)을 중심으로」, 『인문논총』 Vol. 47. 창원: 경남대학교 인문과학연구소.

[24] 2024 「길장 이제설의 중층적 특성-헤겔 변증법 형식과 열린 변증법적 함의를 중심으로」, 『동아시아불교문화』 Vol. 61. 부산: 동아시아불교문화학회.

[25] 박대용(동광)

[26] 2018 「디그나가의 아포하론에 있어 ‘말의 의미’(śabdārtha) －‘푸른 연꽃’(nīlotpala)과 ‘까마귀 둥지’(kākanilaya)의 사례 분석을 중심으로 」, 『불교학연구』 Vol. 57. 서울: 불교학연구회

[27] 2022 「유가행중관학파(YogācāraMādhyamika)의 아포하론 수용과 전개 연구- 샨따락시따와 까말라쉴라를 중심으로 」, 『선문화연구』 Vol. 33. 서울: 한국불교선리연구원

[28] 2023 「다르마끼르띠의 아포하(apoha) 변용과 특징에 관한 연구」, 『불교학연구』 Vol. 77. 서울: 불교학연구회

[29] 박영학(2009). 「원효의 언어관 연구」, 『원불교사상과 종교문화』 Vol. 42. 익산: 원불교사상연구원.

[30] 배경아

[31] 2013 「아포하론의 새로운 분류에 대한 고찰」, 『동아시아불교문화』 Vol. 0. No. 14. 부산: 동아시아불교문화학회.

[32] 2015 「디그나가(Dignāga)의 아포하론」, 한국연구재단 연구보고서.

[33] Baker, Don(2008). Korean Spirituality, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
10.21313/hawaii/9780824832339.001.0001

[34] Blomberg, Johan · Przemysław Żywiczyński(2022). “Language and Its Limits: Meaning, Reference and the Ineffable in Buddhist Philosophy.” Topoi, Vol. 41, pp. 483-496.
10.1007/s11245-021-09756-z

[35] Dreyfus, Hubert L.

[36] 1972 What Computers Can‘t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. Cambridge: MIT Press.

[37] 1991 Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger‘s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge: MIT Press.

[38] 2002 “Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 367-383.
10.1023/A:1021351606209

[39] 2014 “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental.” in Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action. ed. Mark A. Wrathall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-65.

[40] Dreyfus, Hubert L. · Stuart E. Dreyfus(1986). Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer. New York: Free Press.

[41] Dunne, John D. (2004). Foundations of Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

[42] Franco, Eli(1997). Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien.

[43] Garfield, Jay(2002). Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10.1093/oso/9780195145519.001.0001

[44] Hattori, Masaaki(1968). Dignāga, On Perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

[45] Hayes, Richard P.(1988). Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2

[46] Ho, Chien-hsing(2014). “The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang’s Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy.” In Chen-kuo Lin · Michael Radich (eds.), A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, pp. 397-418.
10.15460/hup.79.606

[47] Kant, Immanuel

[48] 1911 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Bd. III, Berlin: Georg Reimer.

[49] 1998 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer · Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[50] Katsura, Shoryu

[51] 1979 “The Apoha Theory of Dignāga.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 28(1), pp. 16-20.

[52] 1991 “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha.” In Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 129-146.

[53] Kim, Taesoo and Kim, Dugsam (2024). “The Common Orientation of Community Psychology and Wonhyo’s Thought: ‘One Mind’, ‘Harmonizing Disputes’ and ‘Non.hindrance’ in Focus,” Religions 15(7), pp. 12-25.
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[54] Kellner, Birgit et al.(eds.) (2020). Reverberations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

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